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Abstract
This paper presents a perspective on some of the organizational and economic conse
quences of the fallibility in human judgments and decisions. The effects of fallibility
are explored in several different contexts. For instance, the paper shows that a divers
ification of political authority in the hands of many individuals has some desirable
consequences, previously not adequately identified, vis a vis its concentration in the
hands of a few. It examines the consequences of fallibility in choosing the successors
to the current set of managers in organizations, and how these consequences might
differ between centralized and decentralized organizations. It illustrates some trade
offs that arise from individuals' fallibility in the choice of projects and ideas within
settings such as committees, hierarchies and polyarchies. It compares the perform
ances of hierarchies and polyarchies, focusing on how they might accept or reject
innovation-oriented projects, such as R&D investments, and ideas for new products
and technologies.
Both the fallibility of an individual and that of an organization are viewed largely as
reflections of the scarcity of such resources as time (including the importance of the
timeliness of decisions), effort, the number and types of employees (which translate
into personnel costs), and the intrinsic abilities of heterogeneous individuals for deci
sion making and communication. A part of the paper describes some aspects of the
approach underlying the analyses of human fallibility. This description highlights: the
premises concerning an individual decision maker, the potential association between
the motivation of an organization's employees and their fallibility, and the nature and
the aims of the analysis of organizations.

* I thank James Heckman, Sherwin Rosen, Alan Schwartz and Jitendra Singh for dis
cussions and Jacques Cremer, Carl Shapiro and Timothy Taylor for comments on an
earlier version of this paper. Some parts of this paper are based on joint research with
Joseph Stiglitz, to whom I am deeply indebted.
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Introduction
Human judgments are fallible. This often contn'butes to an acceptance of bad projects,
policies, and ideas, and a rejection of good ones. One aspect of fallibility is that an
individual typically can extract only part of the decision-relevant information from the
limited raw data available. My emphasis here is on the time and effort that an indi
vidual spends on decision making, including that spent on formulating and choosing,
from the large number of possibilities, the information to be extracted. Another aspect
of fallibility arises from the importance of the timeliness of decisions. A decision may
become less fallible in some ways if more time is spent on it, but the additional delay
may also reduce its value. Yet another aspect of fallibility is that individuals have
biases which may not even be apparent to themselves or to others.
If the fallibility of any one individual were the only relevant issue, then, at least in
principle, perfect organizational decision making might be achievable. If any one indi
vidual has only a part of the total available information, then, by suitably structuring
the exchange of information among many individuals, it might be possible to have, in
aggregate, all of the information. Likewise, although any one individual has a limited
capacity to extract information from the raw data, it might be possible to overcome this
limitation by dividing and recombining the total task among many individuals.
One rough analogy here is to a network of computers, each with limited capacity, such
that many of them together can fully accomplish the computational task at hand.
Another rotw~ analogy is to the design of reliable systems using unreliable compon
ents. A celebrated result in this field, the Moore-Shannon theorem, shows that if a
component has some capacity to perform, then specific structures of components can
be devised, by using a sufficiently large number of components, in such a way that the
system is completely reliable (Harrison, 1965, pp. 255-62). It turns out that this
theorem's result has little to do with the specific structures. It hinges on having an
infinite number of components (Sah and Stiglitz, 1988, p. 468), which, to an economist,
implies an infinite cost Consequently, the theorem is not of much organizational use.
A more fundamental reason why the above arguments cannot be translated to organi
zations is that human communication is also fallible. Faultless communication of facts
as well as of biases and nuances of judgment is typically not possible. Fallible com
munication distorts and alters information. It also includes the possibility of a
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deleterious mutual contamination of information. Consequently, even if there were no
personnel costs involved in hiring individuals, it may still not be possible to achieve
perfect organizational decision making, no matter how many individuals work together
or how they are organized. Personnel costs make this situation even worse.
Thus, in the picture drawn here, both the fallibility of an individual and that of an
organization are largely reflections of the scarcity of such resources as time (including
the importance of the timeliness of decisions), effort; the number and types of
employees (which translate into personnel costs), and the intrinsic abilities of hetero
geneous individuals for decision making and communication. This picture is consistent
with an individual's economizing behavior. Moreover, the nature of the fallibility of
an organization, or of any multi-person entity, depends not only on the nature of indi
viduals' fallibility but also on the organization's "architecture": that is, on those fea
tures of the organization which influence how individuals' decisions become aggregated.
This paper attempts to present a perspective on some organizational consequences of
human fallibility. It may 'be easier to get a flavor of the relevant issues by examining
the role of fallibility in specific settings, rather than through abstract arguments. So,
in the next three sections, I consider several different settings: the question of diversif
ication versus concentration of political authority, the managerial succession process
in organizations, and the choice of ideas and projects (including innovation-oriented
projects) in organizations.1 In the last section, I highlight some aspects of the
approach underlying the analyses of human fallibility, in particular: the premises con
cerning an individual decision maker, the potential association between the motivation
of an organization's employees and their fallibility, and the nature and the aims of the
analysis of organizations.
While focusing on human fallibility, I abstract in this pap_er from most other considera
tions. Apart from considerations of length, this is to complement the other papers in
this symposium which deal with several other considerations. However, since some
aspects of individual behavior emphasized in this paper may remind readers of the lit-

1. The role of fallibility has been considered in several other settings. See, for instance, Von Furstenberg
and Jeong (1988) on the sources of macroeconomic uncertainty, Klevorick et al. (1984) on the decision
making process of juries in legal trials, and Rose-Ackerman (1986) on appellate procedures in public
bureaucracies that disburse entitlements. Also, models resembling some of those employed in the study
of human fallibility can be found in such literatures as the engineering literature on safety monitoring
devices and relay circuits, and the computer-science literature on fault-tolerant computing, distributed pro
cessing and error-correcting codes.
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erature on bounded rationality (see Simon, 1979, for a lucid overview and references),
I present in the last section some brief remarks on this literature.

\.:

Diversification versus Concentration of Political Authority
The recognition of the insuperable limits to his
knowledge ought indeed to teach the student of society a
lesson in humility which should guard him against becoming
an accomplice in men's fatal striving to control society....
Friedrich Hayek (1978, p. 34)
Plato's ranking of political systems, from best to worst, was: aristocracy, timocracy
(governance by a soldier caste), oligarchy, democracy and tyranny (Bloom, 1968, Book
VIII). The debate on the merits of alternative political systems that Plato initiated,
though often polemical and tendentious, has been one of the longest running intellec
tual debates in history. The changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in the
late 1980s have led some to suggest that such debates have been concluded.2
However, this scenario is unlikely. For instance, an archetypal comparison in the last
four decades has been between a political-economic system based on despotic party
bosses versus one based <>n greedy capitalists and vile politicians. In contrast, one of
the archetypal comparisons in the coming decades may be between a market economy
that is closely guided by the government or by large corporations (e.g., the post-War
Japanese economy has been viewed as having been guided by elite government offi
cials) versus one that is comparatively unguided (as many would say is the case in the
-- - • 3
U.:S.J.

At a somewhat more basic level, an implicit debate is between those who postulate the
pivotal role of "preceptors" in the governance of a society versus those who do not.
(Here, "preceptor" is a shorthand for an individual who exercises significant societal

2. Fukuyama (1989) derives such a view from an unorthodox use of Hegelian dialectics.

See Islam (1990)

for a different view.

3. Analogous comparisons and questions concerning the degree ofcentralization ofgovernment institutions
have been important. For example: Is a regionally-decentralized federal system, as in the U.S., better or
worse than a more centralized one, as in France? Is it better to have several government organizations,
rather than just one, provide the same services or deal with the same problems, even though this entails
duplication and perhaps internecine competition?
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authority. This category includes elite bureaucrats, political leaders, and planners.)
What has changed at different times in different societies is the backdrop of this
debate and the actors who are claimants to the role of preceptors. This debate is
likely to continue.
Opposing views on this debate have been exposited and criticized from many perspec
tives. Popper's (1960) magisterial exposition and critique of the theories and prescrip
tions of Plato, Hegel and Marx is a leading example. However, the role of human
fallibility does not appear to have been studied in this context. This section presents
some arguments concerning this issue; see Sah (1989) for models and additional
results.
Consider the following stylized framework. Total societal authority relating to such
issues as which government policies are to be pursued, and the nature and the degree
of government intervention, is divided among preceptors. A society. is called "more
centralized" or "less centralized" depending on whether there are few or many precep
tors. (Within reasonable bounds, the precise numbers are unimportant here.) All
preceptors are fallible, but some are more fallible than others. Also, before they are
placed in positions of authority, the relevant differences in the abilities of preceptors
can be observed only to a limited degree. The aggregate of the performances of all
the preceptors in a period is a key determinant of the societal capital (i.e., physical,
human and other forms of capital) at the end of the period. This capital, along with
the aggregate performance of all the preceptors in the next period, determines the
societal capital at the end of the next period, and so on.
· It follows, then, that a less centralized society has the advantage of a greater diversif
ication of its performance across a larger number of preceptors. This is because
diversification here dilutes the impact of the ability, or .the lack thereof, of each pre
ceptor on the aggregate societal performance. An analogy based on financial invest
ment may be useful in bringing this point out. Think of the current societal capital as
the initial wealth that is divided equally among a given number of investment managers
(preceptors) who act independently of one another. An investment manager achieves
a random return, but it is more likely to be higher if the investment manager is more
capable. For the moment, assume that the investment managers are randomly selected
from a given pool. Also, assume for now that there are no economies or diseconomies
of scale in societal decision making. In the analogy of financial investment, this last
assumption is represented as follows. The probabilities of different returns on the total
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wealth do not change if one investment manager is replaced by two with the same
ability as the former, but with each managing half as much wealth.
Then, the wealth in any future period will have the same mean but a higher volatility
under greater centralization. The difference in volatility will be more dramatic if there
are large differences among the abilities of the investment managers ( as perhaps is the
case for preceptors), or if the difference in the number of investment managers in the
two situations being compared is large. Thus, for political systems, the largest differ
ence in the volatility of performance will be between an absolute dictatorship with a
single preceptor and a system in which political authority is widely distributed.

It is not suggested here that highly centralized societies cannot have very good per
formances. Such a society may get a preceptor like Lee Kwan Yu of Singapore or the
late Chung Hee Park of South Korea, who have been viewed as having made substan
tial contributions to their societies. By the same token, such a society may get a
preceptor like Idi Amin of Uganda, with correspondingly opposite consequences. Nor
is it claimed here that the _mean performance of more centralized and less centralized
societies will be similar. What is suggested here is that, setting aside a number of con
siderations, an effect of human fallibility is that more centralized societies will have
more volatile performances.
Gains from Coordination and Economies of Scale in Societal Decision Making. The
possibility of such gains has been among the most enduring arguments in favor of
centralized societies. These were, for instance, central to Lenin's (1932, p. 84) hope
that the "whole of society would become a single office and a single factory." A key
technical-economic argument in favor of the collectivization of Soviet agriculture was
that a single authority making all decisions for production and for resource allocation,
such as through machine tractor stations, would reap th~ otherwise unavailable advan
tages of coordination and of economies of scale, and that these advantages would more

than offset the losses from weakened incentives.
While the presence of economies of scale in societal decision making may benefit a
centralized society, there are also related drawbacks. Suppose that the future per
formance of an economy drops precipitously if its current societal capital falls below
some threshold level. An example is the sequence of deleterious events that ensue
from a substantial lowering of a country's credit rating in the international capital
markets. These often include projects currently in the pipeline being shelved, credit
becoming exorbitantly expensive for many future periods, and the domestic industrial
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and financial infrastructure being severely damaged. Such features will lead to a
worsening, over time, of the relative performance of a more centralized society,
because the probability of a very bad outcome is higher in this case. One bad dictator
can, in a few periods, ruin the society to such a degree that the resulting lack of a
threshold level of societal capital impairs performance for many future periods, even
if there are significant economies of scale in societal decision making.
Likewise, while the potential for coordination may benefit a centralized society, there
are countervailing effects as well. Since coordination is not possible without commun
ication, and communication is fallible (a central premise in this paper), coordination
beyond some point will be detrimental. Moreover, coordination almost always intro
duces delays. ff each preceptor has to coordinate with several others, then many
decisions must wait until other decisions have been made and communicated. Such
delays are perhaps costlier the more rapid the change in the economic environment.4

Merit-based Selection of Preceptors. Another argument in favor of centralized soci
eties that has been historically important goes like this. In a more centralized society,
more hinges on the ability of fewer individuals. Hence, a greater effort will be made
to ensure that these individuals are of higher ability. This will improve the society's
performance.
Such an emphasis on "merit-based selection" was a foundation of Chinese bureaucracy,
which lasted more than two millennia, originating in the Western Han dynasty and
enduring until its formal abolition in the early 20th century. This bureaucracy invented
elaborate methods for selecting a very small group of individuals who were to exercise
vast administrative authority. At times, emperors themselves administered and super
vised the examination of candidates (Franke, 1960). A similar emphasis on merit
based selection provided a basis of the British cadres Ol'. "civil services" designated for
colonial rule. The members of the elite civil services, always very small in number,
were to be rigorously selected and then fully empowered to rule the colonies. Domes
tic variants and successors of these civil services, deriving their legitimacy largely from
a merit-based selection, can be found today in most of the former colonies. The
members of these services exercise far greater authority than their unelected counter
parts in most modem democracies.

4. These and other adverse consequences of coordination were largely ignored in the post-War theory and
practice of economic planning in socialist and mixed economies, as well as in the literature on economic
growth.
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·. A system of merit-based selection of preceptors is obviously better than one based on
bribery and nepotism. However, there are several reasons, apart from the direct public
and private costs of such a system, that limit the extent to which it can improve the
performance of centraliz.ed societies. Once a system has been in place for some time,
and is thus well understood, a larger proportion of those who qualify are likely to do
so less because of their intrinsic abilities and more because of the resources they spent
on the coaching they needed to master the techniques necessary to qualify. More
important, selection systems do not change as rapidly as does the mix of the charac
teristics of the preceptors that is most useful to a society. This may partly reflect
inertia. It may also reflect the fact that no one has the ability to fully foresee the char
acteristics of preceptors that will be societally most valuable in the future. Again, this
is a reflection of human fallibility. A less centralized society is partially insured against
this problem because the larger number of preceptors are more likely to span a wider
range of characteristics. Diversification here not only reduces risk in a standard, static
sense, but it also has a deeper, longer-term advantage in an environment that is chang
ing and is essentially unpredictable.

Some Empirical Implications. The perspective presented in this section can help
interpret some aspects of the post-War development experience. For instance, the
superior performance of a small number of countries with centralized political author
ity ( e.g., South Korea, Singapore, and, more recently, Indonesia) has often been
presented as evidence that centralized political authority is conducive, if not essential,
to rapid progress in the early phases of development. What is left out in this line of
reasoning is that, during the last four decades, political authority has actually been
highly centralized in the vast majority of developing countries (in most cases, dicta~
torships), and that, with a handful of exceptions of the type noted above, their
performance has been poor. This overall pattern is in accord with the perspective
presented here.
Moreover, this perspective may help explain some puzzles. For instance, since the
October Revolution, there have been periods during which the performance of the
Soviet economy was judged by outside observers to be remarkably good in comparison
to historical and contemporary international standards. Given that the cumulative
performance has turned out to be quite disappointing, it is not yet sufficiently under
stood why the Soviet economy performed as well as it did during particular periods.
On the other hand, such a performance of a highly centralized economy, over time, is
consistent with the perspective presented here.
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. The Succession of Managers in Organizations
The current set of managers in any organization must, at some stage, be replaced. A
part of human fallibility is that the choices of successors are fallible. Thus, an
organization's succession process has dynamic consequences for its performance; for
example, the quality of the current managers is influenced by that of the past man
agers, and the current managers will affect the quality of the future managers. A
natural question, then, is: how does the degree of centralization, in regard to the
decision-making authority to appoint successor managers within an organization, affect
the quality of the managers actually appointed?
Consider, first, an organization consisting of two managers. If one of these two man
agers chooses the successor for himself or herself as well as for the other manager,
then, arguably, this organization is more centralired than one in which each manager
chooses his or her own successor. Extending this further, consider an organization
consisting of many managers, only some of whom appoint successors. The number of
slots for which a particular manager appoints successors varies across managers. The
total number of slots in the organizations under consideration is fixed. Then, one
organization could be viewed as being more centralired than another if, in the former,
a smaller fraction of those who appoint successors have the authority to appoint a
larger fraction of the total number of successors.

Now, suppose. that individuals differ in their abilities, including their ability to choose
able successors, and that these differences are ascertainable in advance only to a
limited degre..e. Suppose that there are two types of managers: those with high and
those with low abilities to select successor managers. Call them "good" and "bad" man
agers, respectively. Both types of managers may choose a bad successor for a given
slot, but a good manager is less likely to do so than a bad manager. Then, an indi
cator of the managerial quality in an organization is its steady-state distribution of
managerial abilities; that is, the probability density of having different numbers of good
managers in the organization, in the hypothetical situation in which this density does
not change over time.

This indicator shows that there is a greater dispersion in the distribution of managerial
abilities in a more centralired organization (Sah and Stiglitz, 1990). The intuition
behind this result is as follows. While a good manager choosing a large number of
successors is likely to have a significant beneficial effect on the quality of managers,
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a bad manager placed in the same position has a correspondingly large adverse effect.
Therefore, greater centralization induces a greater dispersion in managerial quality.
The relationship between the quality of managers and the output or the performance
of an organization depends in part on how the managers are organized and what tasks
they perform. Suppose that managers who are good or bad in choosing successors are
also, respectively, good or bad in producing output. Suppose the output of an organ
ization depends only on the number of good managers; that is, bad managers are an
irrelevant but not a harmful input. Suppose that the extra output due to an additional
good manager is positive, and that it decreases if the number of good managers
increases. Then, an effect of the greater dispersion in the number of good managers
in a more centralized organization is to depress its expected output. The expected
value of the output is also depressed if there is some risk aversion.

The Choice of Projects and Ideas in Organizations
In this section, I discuss some of the trade-offs that may arise from human fallibility
in the choice of projects and ideas in organizations. The background for this discus
sion is provided by some stylized settings. I first consider a committee with fallible
members. I then compare hierarchies and polyarchies, to be defined below, focusing
on how they might accept or reject innovation-oriented projects.
Committees

Consider a committee with n members who must collectively decide to accept or reject
various projects in a portfolio. The word "project" is a shorthand here for such objects
of decisions as investment opportunities and ideas to be pursued and implemented.
It does not, however, refer to the choice of personnel, which was discussed earlier.
The projects are of two types: "good" and "bad." Parts of the limited total available
information about any particular project are randomly distributed across members.
Communication among members is limited. Each member makes a yes-no decision
on each project.
A committee member can make two types of errors: the error of rejecting a good
project and that of accepting a bad project. Suppose that a member has some ability,
though not perfect, to identify a project's quality. Thus, a member is more likely to
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accept a good project than a bad project. In addition, suppose that the committee
members have identical abilities and that the chance that a member will make a par
ticular type of error for particular project is independent across members and has
the same probability for all members.

a

The quality of the portfolio of projects available to the committee is summarized as
follows. The quality of a portfolio is called "average" if its expected value would be
zero if all of the projects were accepted. An example of such a portfolio is one in
which half the projects are good, half bad, and the gain from a good project is the
same as the loss from a bad project. The quality of a portfolio is called "below aver
age" or "above average" depending on whether its expected value would be negative or
positive if all of the projects were accepted.
The committee accepts a project if k or more members accept it, and rejects it other
wise. Thus, the acceptance rule k = n/2 describes the majority rule. For a given n,
a larger k implies a tighter acceptance rule. This decreases the committee's probability
of accepting a bad project, but also increases the probability of rejecting a good pro
ject. A relevant question, then, is: which acceptance rule maximizes the expected
value of the committee's decisions? This question has a crisp answer. It turns out that
the optimal acceptance rule can be stated as an explicit closed-form formula expressed
in terms of the parameters (Sah, 1990).5 This formula also allows us to examine how
the optimal acceptance rule will differ in different environments.
For example, Figure 1 depicts the case in which a committee member is as likely to
reject a good project as to accept a bad project. The precise magnitude of the proba
bility of either error is irrelevant for the conclusions described here. If the portfolio
quality is average, then, as line a shows, the optimal acceptance rule is half of the com-

5. The conclusions presented in the text can be obtained directly from the formula described here; see Sah
(1990) for its derivation and for additional results. Denote the fraction of good projects in the portfolio
by Cl. Denote the net pay-offs from a good and a bad project by z1 and. -z2 respectively, where z1 and z2
are positive. Define e =czz1 - (1 - «)z:z- The portfolio quality is called below average, average, or
above average, depending on whether e is negative, zero, or positive. Define P=1 - e/czz1• Thus, P ~ 1
if e ~ 0. Let q1 denote the probability that a committee member will reject a good project. Let q2 denote
the probability that a committee member will accept a bad project. Assume that 1 > 1 - q 1 > q2 > O.
Define t (1 - q1)/q2, r I! q1/(1 - qi) and K (tn P - n tn r)/tn(t/r). Treat k and n as nonneg
ative integers (for brevity, this feature will be overlooked in Figures 1 and 2 presented later). Assume that
n ~ 1. Then, k = 0 is optimal if and only if P ~ ,n, and k = n is optimal if and only if P ~ rf'-1• The
interior values of optimal k are obtained as follows. If K is not an integer, then the only optimal value of
k is the smallest integer larger than K. If K is an integer, then the only optimal values of k are K and
K+ 1.

=

=

Figure 1

The optimal acceptance rule for a committee in which a committee member is as likely to reject a good project
as to accept a bad project.

The optimal
acceptance
rule, k.

C

a

b

Graphs a, b and c respectively depict the case in which the portfolio quality is average, above average and below
average. The·slope of a is one-half.

Figure2
The optimal acceptance rule for a committee facing a portfolio of average quality.

The optimal
acceptance
rule, k.

Graphs a, d and e respectively depict the case in which a committee member's probability of rejecting
a good
project is the same as, larger than and smaller than that of accepting_ a bad project. The slope of graph e
is less
than one.
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mittee size. That is, the majority rule is optimal. H the portfolio quality is above
average, then the line representing the acceptance rule shifts vertically downwards, as
shown by line b. In this case, the optimal acceptance rule is less than half of the com
mittee size. H the portfolio quality is very high and if the committee size is very small,
then the optimal acceptance rule is at the extreme at which k = O; that is, all projects
should be accepted. H this is not the case, then the slope of the line representing the
optimal acceptance rule remains unchanged at one-half. That is, the optimal accep
tance rule increases by unity if the committee size increases by two.
Analogous conclusions hold for a below average portfolio, as shown by line c in Figure
1. The optimal acceptance rule is more than half of the committee size. H the port
folio quality is very low and if the committee size is very small, then the optimal
acceptance rule· is at the extreme at which k = n; that is, complete unanimity is opti
mal. Otherwise, the slope of the line representing the optimal acceptance rule is again
one-half.
Figure 1 also shows that, unless an extreme acceptance rule is optimal, the optimal
acceptance rule is slacker if the portfolio quality is better. This intuitive result holds
even if the probabilities of a member's two types of errors have different magnitudes.
Next, compare two committees. In the first, a member is more likely to reject a good
project than to accept a bad project. In the second, the situation is the opposite. We
would expect the optimal acceptance rule to be slacker in the first committee. This
is indeed the case if the portfolio quality is average. FtgW'e 2 depicts this case. H a
member is as likely to reject a good project as to accept a bad project, then, as before,
the optimal acceptance rule is half of the committee size, as shown by line a. The line
representing the optimal acceptance rule rotates clockwise, to line d, if a member is
more likely to reject a good project than to accept a bad project. The opposite is the
case if a member is less likely to reject a good project than to accept a bad project, as
is shown by line e. Once again, these conclusions do not depend on the precise magni
tudes of the probability of either error.

An interpretation of the optimal acceptance rule is as follows. Here, if a project is
desirable at a given number of approvals, then it is also desirable at a higher number
of approvals. For any given number of approvals that a project has received, we can
calculate the posterior probability that this project is good; the corresponding prior
probability is simply the fraction of good projects in the portfolio. Thus, the optimal
acceptance rule is the smallest number of approvals at which the posterior expected
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profit from a project (that is, the expected profit calculated using the posterior prob
ability) is positive. A change in a parameter will, in general, affect this smallest
number. For example, suppose one committee faces a better project portfolio than
another. Then, the former committee's posterior expected profit will be larger at each
possible number of approvals. Hence, the smallest number of approvals at which its
posterior expected profit is positive cannot be larger. Consequently, its optimal accep
tance rule cannot be tighter.

Some Other Trade-offs. The trade-off on which the preceding analysis focused is that
a tighter acceptance rule lowers the committee's probability of accepting a bad project,
while raising that of rejecting a good project. Some of the other trade-offs that may
be relevant are briefly noted here.
For example, in choosing the size of a committee, a trade-off arises between the hw1er
personnel cost of a larger committee and the potentially improved quality of decisions
of a larger committee. For a committee whose members choose what information to
collect, as well as what individual decision rules to follow for accepting projects, there
are trade-offs concerning how much individuals should spend on gathering information,
what decision rules they should follow, and what acceptance rule the committee should
use.6
Additional trade-offs arise in other, more complex settings. For instance, consider a
multi-tier hierarchy in which each tier acts as a committee that decides which projects
will be evaluated by the next higher tier. The final acceptance decision is made at the
highest tier. A trade-off here involves how many tiers to have, of what sizes, and what
acceptance rules to have for the various tiers. A larger number of tiers or a tighter
acceptance rule at any tier implies an overall tighter screening of projects. Another
trade-off in multi-tier organizations involves balancing the personnel cost of assigning
individuals of different presumed levels of abilities to different tiers against the result
ing quality of organizational decisions.

6. In typical committees, members vote more or less simultaneously.

An alternative to this is sequential
decision making in which each decision maker has some information concerning the antecedent stages at
which decisions were made. This alternative may involve a different delay in the final decision, as well as
a different set of errors in communication. Abstracting from such issues of comparative organizational
analysis, Meyer (1989) has studi,ed sequential decision making in which the organizational task is to choose
one of two objects, given limited information and communication.
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The Choice of Innovation-oriented Projects

Technological innovation has been a principal source of rapid progress since the Indus
trial Revolution (see Mokyr, 1990, and references therein). The explanation of the
differences in the pace of such innovation in different societies remains a fundamental
question. Also, researchers have tentatively identified patterns of innovation that are
noteworthy; for instance, the share of significant industrial innovations produced by
small firms in the U.S. appears to be larger than their shares of sales, employment, or
R&D spending in the industrial sector (Scherer, 1984, pp. 222-37). It is thus important
to study decision making concerning the choice of innovation-oriented projects.
A feature of innovation-oriented projects (e.g., R&D investments, and ideas for new
products and technologies) is that the possible returns from them are much more dis
persed than those from routine projects (e.g., projects for manufacturing standardized
products using standardized technologies). Truly extraordinary returns are possible
from some innovation-oriented projects but not from virtually any routine project. On
the other hand, the entire investment might be lost for a much larger proportion of
innovation-oriented projects than for routine projects. Another feature of innovation
oriented projects might be called "unfamiliarity." For example, it is more difficult for
two persons, even if they are experts, to communicate their information about an
innovation-oriented project than about a routine project. This is partly because ade
quate past experiences and examples do not exist for most innovation-oriented projects
against which individuals can easily calibrate their own assessments or using which they
can easily communicate their views. Moreover, it is possible that individuals' biases
play a greater role in their decisions if a project is more unfamiliar.
ffierarchies and Polyarchies. Consider two stylized architectures, a "hierarchy" and
a "polyarchy," each consisting of two managers. In the Jnerarchy, each project is first
evaluated by the lower-down manager; if approved, the project is evaluated by the
higher-up manager, who finally accepts or rejects the project. In the polyarchy, each
manager can undertake projects independently of the other, and a manager does not
know whether a project under consideration has been rejected or even evaluated by
the other manager.

This dichotomy attempts to capture the idea that, compared to a hierarchy, a polyarchy
entails a greater independence in decision making, in the sense that a constituent unit
can more easily accept a project without needing the approval of others. A related
idea is that a project has more opportunities of being independently evaluated in a
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polyarchy. Of course, the details of the dichotomy can be altered. For instance, the
constituent units of a hierarchy or a polyarchy may be organizations themselves, instead
of managers. (Therefore, in the rest of this section, I will refer to a constituent unit
simply as a "screen.") Or, there may be many screens in a hierarchy or a polyarchy,
instead of just two. Also, it might be possible to assess the relative importance of hier
archical and polyarchical attributes in particular real-world institutions. For instance,
a large corporation with a unified governance is more hierarchical than one that is
divided into several independent divisions that can deal with the same product groups
and can mutually compete. Similarly, an economy with very few venture capitalists is
more hierarchical than one with many.
Now, consider the performance of the simple two-unit hierarchy and polyarchy describ

ed above (see Sah and Stiglitz, 1986, 1988, for models and results). First, suppose that
a screen makes the same set of errors (i.e., its probability of accepting a given project
is the same) whether it is a constituent unit of a hierarchy or a polyarchy. Then, a
polyarchy will accept a larger fraction of all types of projects. This is because the two
screens in a polyarchy together have a larger probability of accepting any given project
than either of them alone, whereas the situation is the opposite in a hierarchy.
Whether the expected profit is larger in a hierarchy or in a polyarchy will depend on
the nature of the project portfolio and that of the errors of the individual screens. For
instance, if there are two types of projects in the project portfolio, then, for a given
portfolio quality and a given probability that a screen will accept a good project, a
polyarchy has a higher expected profit, provided that the probability that a screen will
accept a bad project is below a certain level. The rough underlying intuiti?n is that if
a screen's approval of undesirable projects is a less frequent problem than its rejection
of desirable projects, then giving a second chance to a project (which is what happens
in a polyarchy) is better than introducing a second hurdle (which is what happens in
a hierarchy).
Next, consider the decision rules that the individual screens might use for accepting
projects. Suppose a screen observes the net profit from the projects plus a scalar noise
that has zero mean. Then, a screen in a polyarchy will typically use a more restrictive
decision rule. For instance, the lowest observed profit level at which a screen in a
polyarchy will accept a project to maximize its expected profit will typically be higher
than what a hierarchy will set for its screens to maximize its expected profit. This is
intuitive. A screen in a polyarchy knows that, unlike in a hierarchy, the project it
approves has no further hurdle to cross. A screen in a polyarchy also knows that it
faces a project portfolio that is worse than the original project portfolio because some
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of the projects it contains are those rejected by the other screen. Taldng these respec
tive decision rules into account, which will perform better, a hierarchy or a polyar~y?
Some particular cases of this problem have been analyzed; in these, the expected profit
is higher in a polyarchy if the observations are very noisy (Sah and Stiglitz, 1986).
The performance of different architectures when the unfamiliarity feature of
innovation-oriented projects is taken into account is, I believe, an important issue. It
seems reasonable to conjecture that the presence of unfamiliarity may induce individual
decision-maldng units to exhibit very high probabilities of rejection of very good pro
jects, and, as a result, a highly hierarchical choice of innovation-oriented projects may
hinder innovation. For instance, almost all of the major companies in the office equip
ment business when reprographic technology became feasible failed to see an attractive
market potential for it; Xerox was an exception in this regard. Another example,
closer to economists, is that of the watershed paper of Black and Scholes (1973) on the
pricing of derivative financial assets. This paper was originally rejected by the Review
of Economics and Statistics and the Journal of Political Economy; it was eventually .
accepted by the latter. Many cases like these can be found. In most such cases, the
unfamiliarity feature of the projects may very well have played a central role in the
falh"bility of individual decision maldng units, and, if so, highly hierarchical architectures
( e.g., only one company in the office equipment business or only one economics jour
nal) would have hindered innovation.
Some Related Issues. Several issues in this area, including the following, are potenti
ally important but have yet to be investigated. First, a fine division of labor within
organizations, often increasing over time, is a primary vehicle of productivity in routine
production. However, the division of labor in the evaluation of innovation-oriented
projects may produce adverse effects that are not well recognized. For instance, the
evaluation of projects is often broken down into functional components (such as
technical, marketing and financial), and also into components based on whether the
evaluation is more quantitative, which is usually done at the lower tiers of an organi
zation, or more qualitative, which is usually done at the higher tiers. If the decision
maldng process is highly hierarchical ( e.g., if each functional group has veto power to
reject a project) then the gates that an innovation has to pass through may be unde

sirably narrow. 7

7. See Noyce (1978) for the experiences of a founder and later Chairman of Intel with such outcomes and
their consequences.
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Second, since the architecture determines the acceptance probabilities of various types
of projects, it may in the longer run also affect the distribution of project types that is
generated within the economy. If unfamiliar innovation-oriented projects are almost
surely rejected in an economy, then inventors and research scientists are unlikely to
come up with many such projects, no matter how large the potential for profit. This
is partly for pecuniary reasons, but also because the implementation of an idea is by
itself often an important part of the reward for an inventor.8

Some Characterizations of Human Fallibility
[S]cience is fallible, because science is human.
But... it does not follow that the choice between theories
is arbitrary, or non-rational: ... that our knowledge cannot
grow.
Karl Popper (1966, Vol. II, p. 375)

This section highlights some aspects of the approach underlying the analyses of human
fallibility. It describes the premises concerning an individual decision maker, and then
discusses the potential association between the motivation of an organization's
employees and their fallibility. The section concludes with some brief remarks on the
nature and the aims of the analysis of organizations.

Some Premises Concerning an Individual Decision Maker
The ongoing lack of concrete descriptions and models of bounded rationality has often
been noted by researchers (e.g., Kreps, 1990, p. 773; Lazear, 1988), even though this
term has been in use for more than three decades. A passible source of this lacuna
is that the literature on bounded rationality has often defined individual behavior by
way of contrast, or opposition, to particular versions of neoclassical economics, rather
than by defining it directly. For example, in Simon's (1987, p. 222) words: "The term
'bounded rationality' has been proposed to denote the whole range of limitations on
human knowledge and human computation that prevent economic actors in the real

8. Another issue is the effect of R&D and product market competition on the decision rules of the consti
tuent units within an architecture. Due to these effects, a constituent unit has to take into account others'
responses; sec Stiglitz (1989). Bull and Ordover (1987) have studied a related problem, namely, the choice
of the number of managers by fallible firms facing product market competition.
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world from behaving in ways that approximate the predictions of classical and neoclas
sical theory: including the absence of a complete and consistent utility function for
ordering all possible choices, inability to generate more than a small fraction of the
potentially relevant alternatives, and inability to foresee the consequences of choosing
alternatives...."
To avoid this lacuna, analyses of human fallibility have attempted to spell out directly
the premises concerning an individual decision maker. For example, a premise here
is that an individual can typically extract only a part of the decision-relevant informa
tion from the limited raw data available. This is partly because the individual must
spend time and effort in formulating and choosing (usually implicitly), from the large
number of possibilities, the models of causation and the hypotheses to be explored and
tested. The emphasis here is on the scarcity of time and effort. This scarcity would
remain important in most situations even if, contrary to reality, unlimited raw data
were costlessly available to the individual. In contrast to the literature on bounded
rationality (Simon, 1979), the emphasis here is not on the constraints on an individual's
raw computational power. Nor is the emphasis on the constraints on an individual's
data storage and retrieval capacity, as in some recent interpretations of bounded
rationality; see Lazear (1988) for some remarks on such an interpretation. These con
straints will become increasingly less important, though not necessarily trivial, due to
advances in information technology.
The time spent by an individual on a decision has several different features that con
tribute to its fallibility. First, time has a resource cost, as was noted earlier. Second,
the object of decision itself may change if the decision is delayed, thereby reducing the
value of the earlier effort. Third, a delayed decision usually means that the circum
stances that the individual faces, including others' actions, change.
Biases. Another premise concerning individuals is that they have biases. Different
individuals often look at different parts of the data, even though they share the same
objective. For instance, Robert Solow and George Stigler, both extraordinarily able
economists, may have markedly different opinions on even a relatively narrow question,
although they both have access to the same data and knowledge. This is not easily
explained in terms of differences in objectives. An individual may not even be aware
of many of his or her biases. An example of such a bias is the overestimation by many
individuals of their own abilities; Adam Smith called this the "overweening conceit"; see
Rosen (1986) for some thoughts on this.
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The prevalence of decision-relevant biases has been widely recognized, though the
etiology is still quite rudimentary; see N'isbett and Ross (1980) for an analysis and
extensive references. There have also been some attempts, though far fewer than
needed, to examine the effects that biases have on organizational and economic deci
sions. Lazear (1988) has begun exploring the question of whether or not some
common practices in business organizations (e.g., the use of bonuses versus penalties
in different situations) are in part responses to the nature of individuals' biases.
Akerlof (1990) has analyzed the role of the "salience" of costs and benefits in individual
decision making. George (1980, Ch. 3) has studied the role, often decisive, of the
biases of American presidents and their advisors in foreign policy decisions.

Procedural Aspects of Decision Making. The work of Kahneman and Tversky, especi
ally that which proposes some heuristic procedures as descriptions of individual
decision making under uncertainty and which points out some resulting biases, is
familiar to many economists (Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, 1983). It turns out, how
ever, that researchers on decision heuristics have found a large number of different
models and heuristic procedures. Very little is known about whether or not there is
a small number of basic heuristic procedures and, if not, which procedure is used for
which task in which context and why. Also, the decision-making tasks that are
presently considered in this research are typically much simpler than those faced by
individuals in organizational settings (see Rutherford, 1988, for some references on this
literature).

An understanding of the procedural fundamentals of decision making is important. At
the same time, analyses of the consequences of human fallibility are not entirely c.on
tingent upon this understanding. For example, the perspective presented in an earlier
section on the diversification of political autllority is largely invariant with respect to
which heuristic procedure an individual preceptor might be using. More generally,
many important questions of organizational study and of positive economic analysis
that relate to human fallibility can be fruitfully explored based on a descriptive under
standing of the patterns of both human decision making in different organizational
contexts and the important types of biases that arise in organizational decisions.9

9. See, for instance, Janis (1989) for a description of the patterns of executive decision making during
crises.
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Fallible Communication. A different premise concerning individuals, but now in an
interpersonal setting, is that their communication is fallible. An individual's capacity
for articulation and reception is limited. Communicating facts as well as biases and
judgments, with full precision and comprehensiveness, is difficult and prohibitively
expensive in any language.10 The verbal and written methods and tools with which
individuals can access each other's information and knowledge, themselves have
marked effects on the messages, both as sent and as received. Moreover, some impor
tant forms of communication may be more revealing because they are more imprecise.
For example, most managers insist on face-to-face meetings. At the heart of these
meetings are such imprecise forms of communication as gestures, signs and symbols.
Nevertheless, important "deals" are made or unmade on the outcome of face-to-face
meetings among principals or senior managers, often overriding the detailed analyses
of facts that their supporting staff might have prepared. Organizational economists
have not adequately explained why this sort of communication is so important.

Fallible communication distorts and alters information. The original message may get
replaced by an altogether different but no less plausible message, especially if the com
munication involves several intermediaries. Moreover, communication may lead to a
deleterious mutual contamination of opinions. For instance, when individuals are
asked to interpret some data and are allowed to communicate with one another, they
tend to distort their own interpretations in order to conform to other group members.
This may happen even when there are no pecuniary gains from conformity and con
formity leads to faulty interpretations.11 Further, the nature of the group that is
communicating, and the context of the communication, may themselves have systematic
effects on the nature of the mutual contamination; see J:mi,;'s (1982) analysis of
"groupthink" in cohesive groups. The possibility of the unintended contamination of
information due to communication is also recognized in other contexts. For instance,
in American presidential elections, the results of exit polls on the east coast are
believed to influence voting behavior on the west coast, leacling many public interest
groups to plead that the media should delay the announcement of these results.

10. The fact that all natural languages have only a limited capacity for precision, and a large scope for
ambiguity, may itself reflect an economizing principle.
11. See Campbell (1958) and references therein on the early social psychology literature on errors in com
munication. See Coleman (1990, pp. 219-20) for a related discussion .
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Fallibility

Motivation and Fallibility
A potential device for motivating an organization's employees consists of contracts
through which individuals' compensations may be linked to the outcomes of their activ
ities. The theory of such contracts for the principal-agent relationship has recently
been extensively studied.12 Existing studies have typically focused on characterizing
optimal contracts, taking the structure of the relationship as given (mostly, but not
always, one principal and one agent), rather than on comparing alternative structures
or on endogenously determining the optimal structure. The intra-organizational incen
tives that might result from such contracts are part of what Williamson (1985) has
called internal "low-powered incentives," in contrast to the "high-powered incentives"
that arise in markets. An issue that the principal-agent literature is currently attempt
ing to resolve is that, while the terms of contracts that existing models typically predict
are not only complex but also extremely sensitive to the precise description of impor
tant informational variables, the terms of contracts that are observed in practice are
usually simple (Hart and Holmstrom, 1987, pp.105-6; Stiglitz, 1987, pp. 970-1). More
important, many unresolved questions have been opened up by the recent empirical
studies that show that the link between the performance of corporations and the
rewards received, directly or indirectly, by their CEOs is extremely weak (Baker,
Jensen and Murphy, 1988; Jensen and Murphy, 1990).

a

Suppose the organization's task under consideration is the evaluation and selection of
innovation-oriented projects. Then, several features of such projects, in addition to
those noted in the last section, may render typical principal-agent models less applic
able than they would be in situations in which the organization's task is routine
production ( actually, many principal-agent models were initially developed to analyze
a relatively routine task, namely, sharecropping). For example, a feature of innovation
oriented projects is that the outcome of a project undert;µcen by the organization is not
known for a much longer period than that of routine production. Gestation lags of 15
years or more may arise for projects attempting to invent new drugs. By the time the
outcome of an innovation-oriented project is known, many of those involved in the pro
ject's acceptance decision would have retired or left the organization, while other
activities would have been undertaken that were not a part of the original project but
that have impinged on the outcome of the project. These features increase the diffi-

12. See Hart and Holmstrom (1987) and Sappington (1989) for reviews. See Holmstrom (1989) for a dis
cussion of the role and the limitations of principal-agent type contracts in the context of innovation. Koh
(1989) examines some aspects of principal-agent type contracts in models that deal with human fallibility.
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culty of inferring from the final outcome the levels of effort that were exerted by the
individual members of the group that initially evaluated and approved the project.
Thus, the motivation that can be created through outcome-based compensation con
tracts in these cases is likely to be lower-powered than what might be created in
routine production.
These problems become even more acute for the projects that are rejected by the
organization. The organization does not have in-house information on the quality of
the project that it did not undertake. Other organizations also may not have this infor
mation because, for example, they may undertake the project in a modified version, or
several periods later in changed circumstances. Moreover, whatever information other
organizations have will typically be inaccessible even if it is potentially useful.
The preceding discussion suggests the importance of another organizational device,
namely, the voluntarily agreed-upon supervision of one set of individuals by another,
for modifying the nature and the intensity of the activities of employees who have dif
ferent attributes and motivations. Though this device is extensively used in practice,
it has not received as much economic study as it deserves.13 In particular, the
strengths and weaknesses of supervision, compared to other organizational devices, in
the context of innovation-oriented projects is a virtually unresearched topic.
Finally, it is also important to emphasize that human fallibility does not disappear even
if there are no intra-organizational motivational problems. If it did, then self-employed
individuals will be infallible in their decision making. The absence of intra

organizati.onal motivational problems can improve the quality of effort associated with
each unit of time that an individual spends on decision making. However, the individ
ual still has to contend with such resource problems as the cost of time, the importance
of the timeliness of decisions, and his or her limited· intrinsic ability for decision
making. The point here is not that motivation does not matter, but that, beyond some

13. See, however, Stiglitz (1975) for some early notes, Holmstrom and T'll'Ole (1989, pp.110-3) for a brief
review, and Rosen (1982) for a study in which the supervision needs within organizations are proposed as
a possible explanation for some observed patterns of managerial earnings. _
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moderate level, additional motivation may have a weak effect on the nature of an indi
vidual's fallibility, even if it could be created within organizations at a reasonable cost.14
·Some Remarks on the Analysis of Organizations

It should be apparent from the analysis in the preceding sections that the nature of the
fallibility of an organization, or of any aggregate entity, depends not only on the nature
of the fallibility of the individuals who constitute the organization· but also on the
organization's architecture. Which aspects of the architecture are important depends
on the question at hand ood the context. In general, such aspects may include coordin
ation, communication and reporting relationships. In any event, it will usually not be
appropriate to achieve the transition from an individual to an organization (say, a
firm), as a unit of analysis, by attributing to the organization the same behavioral prop
erties that are attributed, as primitive assumptions, to the individual. Instead, the
organization's behavior will need to be derived as a consequence of its architecture.
The literature on bounded rationality has yielded and inspired many contributions
(March, 1978, and Rutherford, 1988, provide several references). At the same time,
some parts of this literature appear to be aimed at criticizing particular versions of the
neoclassical theory (see, for example, Simon, 1979). In contrast, the analyses of human
fallibility build on the contemporary economics of organization and economics of infor
mation. Descriptive models with different emphases and different degrees of detail are
considered useful in exploring different questions, and the models are consistent with
an individual's economizing behavior. The aim in this case is not criticism, but rather
an attempt to present a perspective that may complement the e~!-:ting frameworh and
that may generate some insights, if not positive predictions. This does not reflect the
view that criticism has little value; indeed, it is important. Instead, it reflects a bias
that criticism, no matter how persuasive, is perhaps less valuable than even a limited
attempt to extend the repertoire of approaches for understanding what is observed.

14. The position that Nisbett and Ross (1980, p. 12) take on the limited efficacy of motivational factors
in related contexts appears to be stronger than the one just stated: "'We argue that many phenomena gen
erally regarded as motivational...can be better understood as products of relatively passionless information
processing errors than of deep-seated motivational forces."
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